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Abstract 
 
Reconciling the two dominant development models of the Washington Consensus 
(WC) and Beijing Model (BM) remains a critical challenge in the literature.  The challenge is 
even more demanding when emerging development paradigms like the Liberal Institutional 
Pluralism (LIP) and New Structural Economics (NSE) schools have to be integrated. While 
the latter has recognized both State and market failures but failed to provide a unified theory, 
the former has left the challenging concern of how institutional diversity matter in the 
development process. We synthesize perspectives from over 150 recently published papers on 
development and Sino-African relations in order to present the relevance of both the WC and 
BM in the long-term and short-run respectively. While the paper provides a unified theory by 
reconciling the WC and the BM to complement the NSE, it at the same time presents a case 
for economic rights and political rights as short-run and long-run development priorities 
respectively. By reconciling the WC with the BM, the study contributes at the same to 
macroeconomic NSE literature of unifying a development theory and to the LIP literature on 
institutional preferences with stages of development. Hence, the proposed reconciliation takes 
into account the structural and institutional realities of nations at difference stages of the 
process of development. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“We endorse the views of the African leaders on this point. But we must point out that we are 
not blind to the fact that the countries which pursue a policy of planned state economy have 
outstripped, in industrial development, those that follow the path of private enterprise. Today, 
China is industrially far ahead of India. Unfortunately, however, this rapid industrial 
development has been accompanied in all cases by a rigid totalitarianism notwithstanding 
Mao Tse Tung's "Hundred Flowers" announcement. Africanists reject totalitarianism in any 
form and accept political democracy as understood in the west. We also reject the economic 
exploitation of the many for the benefit of a few. We accept as policy the equitable 
distribution of wealth aiming, as far as I am concerned, to equality of income which to me is 
the only basis on which the slogan of "equal opportunities" can be founded. Borrowing then 
the best from the East and the best from the West we nonetheless retain and maintain our 
distinctive personality and refuse to be the satraps or stooges of either power block.” 
(Sobukwe, 1959).   
The success and burgeoning economic prosperity of China over the past decades has 
led to growing debates in academic and policy making circles over the relevance of the 
Washington Consensus  (WC) in 21
st
 century development (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2014). 
Narratives have varied from, inter alia: lost decades with the WC (Fofack, 2014, p. 5-6); the 
Beijing Model (BM) more adapted to the 21
st
 century (Nijs, 2008; Huang, 2010); 
development strategies based on a mixture of the WC and other successful development 
strategies (Fosu, 2013a); preferences in economic versus political rights in a development 
approach (Moyo, 2013); institutions more endogenous to economic prosperity (Anyanwu & 
Erhijakpor, 2014).) and; scale of preference in rights between developing and developed 
countries in the era of globalization (Lalountas et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014a).   
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The debates have for the most part erupted because a stream of authors sustain that the 
poor performance of some developing countries is traceable to the WC (Fofack, 2014, p. 6). 
The WC that is based on government failures includes policies of marketisation, privitisation 
and liberalization (inter alia), while the BM is based on government regulation and prudence 
in liberalization & privatization (Nijs, 2008). Akomolafe (2008) has even suggested that 
developing countries should stop looking at the West for instructions because China which is 
now prospering at breath-taking pace was in a similar economic stalemate as most African 
countries about five decades ago. However, while it opted to recourse to internal solutions to 
address its economic issues, Africa decided to follow prescriptions from the WC. The 
disappointment in development has led to growing distrust in Western policies, coupled with, 
amongst others: colonialism, slavery, manipulations during the Cold war, corruption by 
companies from the West and, neocolonialism (Robinson, 2009).  
China has responded to the above growing frustrations by carefully tailoring its 
foreign policy to reflect opposite feelings. China’s unconditional and non-interference 
approach is igniting a lot of interest in the tendencies of Sino-African relations (Taylor, 2006; 
Asche et al., 2008; Besada et al., 2008; Biggeri et al., 2009; Ortmann, 2012).  While  “China 
returns to Africa in the 21st century with not only a need for economic resources but with the 
cash to play the game dramatically and competitively” (Lyman, 2005), there is a growing 
stream of studies sustaining that the Chinese model is only optimal in the short-run (Moyo, 
2013). Moreover the Chinese model has some elements that are not consistent with the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2014).  
The present study complements existing literature by putting some structure on views 
and agenda for an African development consensus. It discusses recent lessons and strategies 
from success stories in developing countries; presents the existing African consensus or New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in light of growing narratives; discusses the 
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Washington and Beijing consensuses as development models; present arguments and schools 
of thought. The resulting agenda consists of: establishing complementarities based on recent 
narratives in the literature; reconciling schools of thoughts and; reflecting the Moyo (2013) 
conjecture on underlying assumptions from Piketty (2014) and Kuznet (1955). This main 
agenda centers on tailoring an African consensus from the underlying narratives, inter alia, 
the: WC, BM, Moyo conjecture, NEPAD, schools of thought and emerging development 
paradigms (New Structural Economics and Liberal Institutional Pluralism).  
Reconciling the two dominant models of development remains a critical challenge in 
the literature. Hence, by presenting views of and challenges for their reconciliation, the study 
substantially steers clear of existing Sino-African development literature which has for the 
most part focused on presenting policy syndromes, schools of thought, debunking the myths 
surrounding the nexus, inter alia. There is an abundant supply of literature on an asymmetric 
Sino-African relationship (Alden, 2006, p. 147; Askouri, 2007, p. 71; Giovannetti & 
Sanfilippo,  2009, p. 506; Elu & Price, 2010, p. 587;   Villoria, 2009, p. 531; Huliaras & 
Magliveras, 2008;  Brooks, 201, p. 113; Kiggundu, 2008, p. 130; Ndjio, 2009, p. 606; Large, 
2008, p. 93; Chemingui & Bchir, 2010, p. 562; Breslin & Taylor, 2008; Power, 2008, p. 7)
2
.  
This bulk of literature has presented, among others: the short-term positive effects of 
the nexus (Duclos, 2011); decisions of investments that are based on resource-motivations 
and poor governance (Renard, 2011; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; De Grauwe et al., 2012); the 
need for multi-polar development strategies (Tull, 2006); push and pull factors motivating 
Chinese investments (Biggeri & Sanfilippo, 2009); hard political views of the nexus (Taylor, 
2007); identification and explanation of the West’s evolving suspicion of the nexus (Huliaras 
                                                 
2
 This literature is consistent with the stream documenting issues in the relationship  (Alves, 2006; Schiere & 
Walkenhorst, 2010; Gaye, 2006; Jenkins & Edwards, 2006; Alden et al., 2008 ;  Moreira, 2007; Guerroro & 
Manji, 2008 ;  Chemingui & Bchir, 2010; Brenton & Walkenhorst, 2010;  Schiere,  2010; Wu & Cheng, 2010; 
Sanfilippo, 2010; Kitissou, 2007;  Wei & Wang, 2009; Biggeri & Sanfilippo, 2009; Lall et al., 2005;  Muneko & 
Koyi, 2008;  Wang & Zheng, 2010; Wang & Zheng, 2012; Ji, 2010; Wei, 2007; Mawdsley, 2008; Duclos, 2011;  
Zhu, 2010;  Klaplinsky & Messner, 2008; De Grauwe et al., 2012;  Renard, 2011; Drogendijk & Blomkvist, 
2013; Lin & Farrell, 2013;   Zhang et al., 2013;  Wei, 2013;  Munemo, 2013; Adekunle & Gitau, 2013; Diaw & 
Lessoua, 2013;  Babatunde, 2013). 
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& Magliveras, 2008); debunking myths surrounding the nexus (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013) 
and; suggesting strategies and solutions to the documented policy syndromes (Asongu & 
Ssozi, 2014). 
In light of the above, this study is a response to the need for building 
complementarities between the WC and the BM (Drogendijk & Blomkvist, 2013, p. 75; 
Wissenbach, 2009, p. 662; Ovadia, 2013, p .23; Carmody & Owusu, 2007, p. 504; Lin & 
Farrell, 2013, p. 85; Gu, 2009, p. 570; Zhang et al., 2013, p. 96; Mohan & Tan-Mullins, 2009, 
p. 588; Kragelund, 2009, p. 644; Kamwanga & Koyi, 2009, p. 6; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011, p. 
31; Osei & Mubiru, 2010, p. 1; Alden & Alves, 2008, p. 43; Sanfilippo, 2010, p. 599; Schiere, 
2010, p. 615; Mohan & Power, 2008, p. 23). This is essentially because the WC prescriptions 
to African countries during the past 30 years have not delivered on the promises for the most 
part (Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Asongu, 2012; Darley, 2012). Hence, it is politically 
correct for China to use this frustration as an instrument in its foreign policy.   
As far as we know, the current research which focuses on searching for a 
complementarity between the WC and BM completely steers clear of documented African-
oriented development models. These include, inter alia: the Africa’s Priority for Economic 
Recovery (APPER, 1986-1990); the Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development (LPA, 
1980-200); the African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990); the African 
Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socioeconomic Recovery 
and Transformation (AAF-SAP, 1989); the 2001 NEPAD (OAU, 1980, 2001; Adedeji, 2002; 
Bujra, 2004); more self-reliance by African countries for better development (Fofack, 2014, p. 
13) and; an interesting plethora of development strategies covered by Fosu (2013a).  
A strand of emerging development models that is closest to the current exposition 
entails the New Structural Economics (NSE) and Liberal Institutional Pluralism (LIP). The 
NSE that  has been presented by Stiglitz & Lin (2013), Stiglitz et al. (2013ab), Norman & 
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Stiglitz (2012), Lin & Monga (2011), and Chang (2002) advocate without necessarily 
working towards a unified economic development theory, the synthesis of liberalism and 
structuralism ideology. Hence, this new approach has recognized both market and State 
failures (Fofack, 2014, p.9). The latter school or LIP focuses on, inter alia: institutional 
diversity; institutional conditions for successful growth and; institutions for effective public 
service delivery (North, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Rodrik, 2008; Brett, 2009).  
As shown above, we steer clear of the preceding strand in a fourfold manner: 
definition of the WC & BM; reconciliation of dominant models in the short-term and long-
term; exposition a unified theory of economic development and; presentation of issues to be 
tackled in light of Piketty’s contradiction of Kuznet on which reconciliation from the Moyo 
conjecture is based. While the paper provides a unified theory by reconciling the WC and the 
BM to complement the NSE, it at the same time presents a case for economic rights and 
political rights as short-run and long-run development priorities respectively. Hence, the 
proposed reconciliation takes account of structural and institutional realities of nations at 
difference stages of the process of development. The rest of the study is presented as follows. 
The views are presented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the resulting agenda while Section 4 
concludes.  
 
2. Views on multi-polar development strategies  
2.1 Achieving development success: strategies and lessons from the developing world 
 The debate on development models from Sino-African relations extends an interesting 
strand of the literature on ‘achieving development success: strategies and lessons from the 
developing world’ (Fosu, 2012, 2013a) from past experiences (Fosu, 2010). They include, 
amongst others: the emerging Asian giants of China and India (Santos-Paulino, 2013; Singh, 
2013; Yao, 2013); Latin America and the Caribbean with particular emphasis on Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Chile and the Dominican Republic  (De Mello, 2013; Solimano, 2013; Trejos, 2013;  
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Pozo et al., 2013; Cardoso, 2013); the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) region with 
analysis of  cases studies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman,  Tunisia  and Bahrain 
(Looney, 2013; Drine, 2013;   Baliamoune-Lutz, 2013; Nyarko, 2013); sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) with perspectives from Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius and South Africa (Lundahl & 
Petersson, 2013; Robinson, 2013; Subramanian, 2013; Fosu, 2013b; Naudé, 2013) and; East 
Asia and the Pacific with emphasis on Vietnam, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia (Warr, 
2013; Khan, 2013; Jomo & Wee, 2013; Thoburn, 2013; Lee, 2013). 
 These views which present a plethora of multi-polar development strategies include, 
among others: China’s political economy founded on ‘disinterested government’; strategies of 
diversification in Bahrain, Oman and the UAE; dynamic policies in Vietnam and Malaysia 
that are oriented towards orthodox-heterodox initiatives; WC focused reforms in China and 
Ghana; natural-resource management policies in Oman, the UAE, Botswana and Bahrain; 
social sector development programs in Tunisia and Costa Rica  and; diversity management 
approaches in India based on democratic political systems.  
 
2.2 Dominant development models 
 
 We discuss this section in three main strands: from the ‘Washington Consensus’ to the 
‘Beijing Model’ through insights into ‘Liberal Institutional Pluralism and New Structural 
Economics’. It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the big ideas in the history of 
African development which have been highlighted in the introduction. What is important to 
note for the interest of this study is that, over three decades of a neoliberal experiment in the 
continent has failed to deliver. Accordingly, the continent’s contribution to global trade has 
dropped to under 1.5% from above 3.8% in the 1950s. While some have labeled the neoliberal 
experiment as lost decades (Mkandawire, 2004), others have been more radical in qualifying 
it as the 20
th
 century economic tragedy (Artadi & Sala-i-Martin, 2003). Some accounts have 
been more proverbial in stating that, whereas Arthur Lewis (1955) led all developing nations 
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to water, many African countries simply refused to drink (Amavilah, 2014). These narratives 
are consistent with the World Bank’s (2011) position that the only region in the developing 
world to miss the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of a 50% reduction of poverty by 
2015 in Africa (Fofack, 2014). In light of the above setbacks, scholars have been searching 
for useful and evidence-based processes of development. Consequently, two new leading 
paradigms of development that have emerged are: the ‘New Structural Economics’ (NSE) and 
the ‘Liberal Institutional Pluralism’ (LIP). 
The LIP that focuses on institutions, norms and rules limiting human behavior has 
been put forward by Brett (2009), Rodrik (2008), Acemoglu et al. (2005) and North (2009). 
From a macroeconomic perspective, the consistency by these authors is tailored towards 
institutional conditions needed for political transformation and economic prosperity. The 
central element of the thesis assumes that two factors affect the economic growth of nations: 
the society’s ability to resolve agency problems and, the ability of institutions to manage 
individuals’ predation. This paradigm received prominence when it was established that long-
term economic prosperity was not independently affected by WC policies, once the quality of 
domestic institutions was factored-in (Easterly & Levine, 2003; Fofack, 2014).  
The NSE that has been presented by Stiglitz & Lin (2013), Stiglitz et al. (2013ab), 
Norman & Stiglitz (2012), Lin & Monga (2011), and Chang (2002) advocate without 
necessarily working towards a unified economic development theory, the synthesis of 
liberalism and structuralism ideology. They have proposed application of an economic 
approach based on neoclassical economics in a bid to understand the determinants of 
economic structure and how their evolution affects development. The synthesis involves 
taking into account both structural characteristics in the understanding of economic 
development and the mission of the government as a driver of infrastructure, integration of 
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markets (inter alia), needed for economic prosperity. Hence, this new approach has 
recognized both market and State failures (Fofack, 2014, p.9). 
Although it has been criticized in some quarters (Huang, 2010), the Chinese 
development model which advocates for State regulation and prudence in market openness is 
being recognized as more adapted than the WC to 21
st
 century development (Asongu & 
Aminkeng, 2013). Relative to the WC that favors complete free trade, this alternative 
development approach puts more emphases on national sovereignty and prudential market 
reforms (Nijs, 2008).  Recent Sino-African literature has substantially documented the 
Chinese consensus as a model for African development. These include, inter alia: China 
representing both a new imperialism and a new model of development (Ovadia, 2013, p. 233);  
though Chinese involvement in the continent is ambivalent and contextual, it offers new 
avenues of African development (Mohan & Power, 2008) and; the dependence theory should 
be overlooked for a more comprehensive understanding of the nexus (Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 
2009, p. 479). 
This strand of the literature is consistent with the view that instead of criticizing the 
Beijing model, it should be engaged (Kuo, 2012, p. 24) because the Sino-African nexus is 
offering new avenues of development that could substantially fight poverty in the continent 
(Carmody, 2009, p. 1197). Wu & Cheng (2010, p. 629) are supportive of the view that  China 
has special lessons for African due to her achievement of poverty mitigation over the past 
decades and; China is bringing substantial transformation to Africa via export of 
entrepreneurial talent and economic dynamism (Friedman, 2009, p. 1). There is indeed an 
abundant literature on the beneficial nature of Sino-African relations, notably:  the reliance on 
capital goods from China that is positive for sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA’s) growth (Munemo, 
2013, p. 106); the important role of African agencies (Mohan & Lampert, 2010, p. 92); 
positive appeals even to non-resource rich countries (Ancharaz, 2009, p. 622); a historical and 
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sustainable relationship (Power & Mohan, 2010, p. 462);  development of specialized 
economic zones (Edinger, 2008) and; economic diversification & mitigation of negative 
shocks from natural resource specialization (Diaw & Lassoua, 2013, p. 189).  
The story about China’s move into Africa is not only flowery. While China’s foreign 
assistance to Africa considerably impacts her development goals, the effect depends on 
institutional and structural characteristics (McCormick, 2008). The land grab by Chinese 
would be more beneficial to actors of local communities if their perspectives are taken into 
account in contract negotiations (Buckley, 2013, p. 429). Kaplinsky & Morris (2009, p. 551) 
have concluded that SSA needs to formulate policies that increase her benefits in natural 
resource exploitation, in essence because Goldstein et al. (2006) have also concluded that 
though the exploitation of resources might benefit the continent, there are unexpected and 
dramatic consequences. In summary, there are both positive and negative effects in Sino-
African relations. Hence, African leaders should work towards stifling the latter effects that 
outweigh the former (Ademola et al., 2009, p. 485). This is in line with an earlier conclusion 
by Edwards (2006, p. 207) that the nexus depending on nations could either be negative or 
positive. Due to growing narratives emphasizing that more studies are needed to sustain 
myths surrounding the Sino-African relationship (Mohan, 2013, p. 1255), various schools of 
thought have emerged that merit emphasis.  
 
2. 3 Arguments and schools of thought  
The neocolonial or pessimistic school has been advanced by pessimists of the China 
model
3. These are predominantly advocates of the WC who regard China’s activities (FDI, 
aid and trade) in Africa to be linked with resource-seeking ambitions and bad governance. 
According to the narrative, Chinese move into Africa is benefiting China and African elites. 
Hence, since this engagement leaves little or no ladder of opportunities for those in the low-
                                                 
3
The Beijing model of development advocates national sovereignty, prudence in market reforms and State 
regulation (Nijs, 2008).  
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income strata, the school sustains that the nexus is not always in the interest of African 
nations. The reference often provided to back-up this thesis is the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA)
4
 from the USA which is hypothesized to go beyond the making of 
profits by promoting good governance (Clinton, 2011).  
The discourses that sustain the thesis include, amongst others: Southern Africa’s 
agricultural export sector not positively affected by Chinese prosperity (Villoria, 2009, p. 
531); Europe and the USA are increasingly suspicious of the Sino-African nexus and are 
tailoring measures with which to increase their leverage (Huliaras & Magliveras, 2008, p. 
399) or the nexus is generally asymmetric from a Western point of view (Alden, 2006, p. 
147);  Chinese prostitutes are looked upon as cheap and junk as commodities from China 
(Ndjio, 2009, p. 606); Chinese trade is rendering African industries very vulnerable 
(Giovannetti & Sanfilippo, 2009, p. 506); great discontent by workers in Chinese industries 
(Brooks, 2010, p. 113); investments from China are destroying some African communities 
like in Sudan  (Askouri, 2007, p. 71) and, driven by the availability of natural resources 
(Kiggundu, 2008, p. 130). The relationship would not be beneficial to Africa because of small 
productive capacities and low degree of diversification (Chemingui & Bchir, 2010, p. 562) or 
low levels of industrialization (Power, 2008, p. 7). Human rights violations could be exported 
to Africa (Brselin & Taylor, 2008; Zhou, 2005) and the nexus may not lead to higher living 
standards in SSA (Elu & Price, 2010, p. 587) broadly because of myths surrounding it 
(Freschi, 2010; De Grauwe et al., 2012; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013, p. 263).  
The Balanced-Development school postulates that contrary to the first school, the 
relationship between China and Africa would be symmetrical if African nations can device 
common policies based on rational economic arguments to balance it (Duclos, 2011). For 
instance, the non-interference policy endows governments in the continent with the leverage 
                                                 
4
 The AGOA provides incentives for African countries to remain consistent with free market policies.  
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of consolidating their sovereignty in mutual projects. Three points are central to elucidating 
this school. First, the Chinese foreign policy of unconditional foreign aid greatly deviates 
from the Western version which patronizes African countries (Tull, 2006). In this light, the 
term ‘colonialism’ used by the pessimistic school to qualify Sino-African relations is very 
misplaced. The basis for such a misplacement is that the employment of ‘trade and 
investment’ as instruments for influencing processes of ‘decision making’ in African 
countries by certain developed countries is similar to some form of ‘neocolonialism’.  Second, 
based on the evidence that most African nations and China had relatively similar economic 
issues in the 1960s and 1970s, African can benefit a lot from China because her breath-taking 
economic prosperity is largely traceable to her choice of independently charting her own 
development course instead of taking prescriptions from the WC. Third, from the perspectives 
of non-interferences and unconditionality, Chinese foreign policy is in accordance with the 
NEPAD’s perspective of African ownership (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013). There is a 
substantial body of recent literature substantiating this second school (Menell, 2010; Duclos, 
2011; Asche & Schüller,  2008; Akomolafe, 2008; Nijs, 2008; Ajakaiye & Kaplinsky, 2009, 
p. 479; Kuo, 2012, p. 24; Carmody, 2009, p. 1197; Munemo, 2013, p. 106; Ademola et al., 
2009, p. 485; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2009, p. 551; Goldstein et al., 2006; Ancharaz, 2009, p. 
622; Friedman, 2009, p. 1; Power & Mohan, 2010, p. 462; Mohan & Lampert, 2010, p. 92; 
Buckley, 2013, p. 429; Mohan, 2013, p. 1255; Edinger, 2008; Jenkins & Edwards, 2006, p. 
207; McCormick, 2008; Diaw & Lassoua, 2013, p. 189; Carmody & Owusu, 2007, p. 504 
and; Wu & Cheng, 2010, p. 629).  
The third stream which is the Accommodation School emphasises that the issue in the 
classification of schools should not be centered around whether China has colonial ambitions 
or not. According to the narrative, it should be oriented towards whether Africa has other 
substantial alternatives beside the predominant West and China (De Grauwe et al., 2012). 
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Hence, the two thoughts motivating this school are: (1) the dominant models presented to 
Africa are the WC and BM and; (2) Western nations are no ‘less neocolonialist’ compared to 
China (Asongu, 2014c; Asongu & Ssozi, 2014). According to this strand, China is using the 
very rules of free market competition established by the WC which according to most 
accounts have failed to deliver in Africa (Bartels et al., 2009; Asongu, 2012; Tuomi, 2011; 
Darley, 2012). Hence, the exploitation of ‘African suspicion’ of some Western double 
standards by China to further her footprint into the continent is politically correct (Asongu & 
Aminkeng, 2014). The plethora of literature sustaining this school of thought include, inter 
alia: Drogendijk & Blomkvist (2013, p. 75), Wissenbach (2009, p. 662), Ovadia, 2013, p 
.233),  Carmody & Owusu (2007, p. 504),  Lin & Farrell (2013, p. 85), Gu (2009, p. 570), 
Zhang et al. (2013, p. 96), Mohan & Tan-Mullins (2009, p. 588), Kragelund (2009, p. 644);  
Kamwanga & Koyi  (2009, p. 6), Kolstad & Wiig (2011, p. 31), Osei & Mubir (2010, p. 1), 
Alden & Alves (2008, p. 43), Sanfilippo (2010, p. 599), Schiere (2010, p. 615) and Mohan & 
Power  (2008, p. 23).  
 
3. Agenda: An African Consensus in the Beijing Model and WC 
 
 Consistent with Asongu & Aminkeng (2014), the NEPAD which to this day is 
acknowledged as the mainstream African consensus may be interpreted to integrate both the 
BM and the WC. According to the narrative, the NEPAD represents a degree of consensus 
among African countries that are seriously working towards the advancement of the 
continent. In essence, it is in line with the WC because values of good governance, human 
rights and democracy are clearly stipulated in its charter. Along the same lines, the Chinese 
policy of non-interference seriously compromises the efforts by bodies such as the African 
Union to sustain and enforce this dimension of the NEPAD policies. Therefore, the Chinese 
policy indirectly endows less democratic governments with the leverage to promote bad 
governance and corruption (among others) which do not constitute some of the core values 
15 
 
shared by the NEPAD. On the other hand, the non-interference and unconditionality policies 
by China are consistent with the NEPADs understanding of African sovereignty
5
. Hence, 
while China in principles treats African countries as equal and sovereign partners; this is not 
the case with some Western nations. Two examples include: the USA’s policy in Saudi 
Arabia that is similar to China’s foreign policy and, France’s foreign policy in Africa which 
has not been characterized by her cherished values of equality, fraternity and liberty (Taylor, 
2006; Asongu & Ssozi, 2014). Therefore, based on the above, both the WC and BM are 
needed in Africa. Hence, the  need to build complementarities.  
 
3.1 Building complementarities  
 Before reconciling schools of thoughts, argument and paradigms, it is relevant to first 
of all support the need for building complementarities between the WC and BM (Asongu, 
2014c). There is a growing body of literature supporting this need, inter alia:  an imperative of 
building complementaries among traditional development partners, China and Africa 
(Schiere, 2010, p. 625);  companies from China almost have similar motivations as 
corporations from the West (Drogendijk & Blomkvist, 2013, p. 75), especially in terms of 
FDI (Lin & Farrell, 2013, p. 85; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011, p. 31 ), experience in two Zambian 
sectors (Kragelund, 2009, p. 644), general resource- & market-seeking interests (Zhang et al., 
2013, p. 96;  Gu, 2009, p. 570; Osei & Mubiru, 2010, p. 1)  and compliance with free-market 
competition standards (Mohan & Tan-Mullins, 2009, p. 588;  Kamwanga & Koyi, 2009, p. 6). 
In summary, the narrative sustains that the Sino-African nexus is an ineluctable process with a 
sound historical evolution (Alden & Alves, 2008, p. 43 ) that requires some cooperation from 
                                                 
5
  “The West are used to telling African countries that if you are liberalized, privatized and become more 
democratic, we will help you. But China treats African countries as equal partners -- the partnership rather than 
conditional relationship…. More and more economists, including me, are considering the Beijing Consensus a 
better model in this century than the Washington model.  …People sometimes make the mistakes that 
modernization equals Westernization. It's not the case. We cannot force the Western model on anything in the 
world.  ….China's rise lies on the changing of geo-economy which is tilting towards the East, not the financial 
crisis in western countries” (Nijs, 2008).   
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traditional development partners for more mutual benefits (Wissenbach, 2009, p. 662). A 
cooperation that would dissipate growing ambivalences which are affecting the new avenues 
of African development (Mohan & Power, 2008, p. 23). 
 
3.2 Reconciling schools of thought and paradigms  
 
 In this section, we shall first reconcile the schools of thought documented above, with 
particular emphasis on: the two dominant models of development and the Moyo conjecture. 
Then we shall discuss how this reconciliation also reconciles the Liberal institutional 
pluralism (LIP) and New Structural economics (NSE) paradigms in the second sub-section. A 
synthesis that at the same time fills some gaps left in the LIP and NSE literatures.  
 
3.2.1 Reconciling schools of thought  
 
 We engage this sub-section in three main strands: emphasis on preference in rights 
(human versus (vs) national, idiosyncratic vs sovereign and, political vs economic); linkages 
among, thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis, schools of thoughts and, dominant development models 
and; use of the Moyo conjecture to reconcile the BM and the WC.  
 The first strand discusses concerns on preferences of rights that are the central 
arguments distinguishing the first-two schools. These include human rights vs national rights 
(Taylor, 2006), idiosyncratic rights vs sovereign rights (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2014) and; 
political rights vs economic rights (Lalountas et al., 2011; Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 2014a). 
Whereas the second sets of rights are consistent with the second school, the first-sets 
dominate narratives of the first school.  
First of all, in China’s foreign policy, national rights precede human rights. As we 
have discussed above, Africa in increasingly discontent about the West’s selective definition 
of human of rights. The suspension of foreign aid to Uganda for exercising her national rights 
to pass an anti-gay bill through the democratic process is a case in point (Asongu, 2014b).  
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   Second, individual or idiosyncratic rights do not  also come before sovereignty rights 
in the Chinese perspective (Taylor, 2006). Given that African nations have been increasingly 
humiliated by issues of hegemony, the Chinese perspective is that by standards of 
international law, sovereign nations should not criticize other sovereign countries on issues 
that are supported by democratic processes at the domestic level.  
Third, as concerns preferences between ‘voting rights’ and ‘the right to food’ which 
have been the issues of heated debates in a recent stream of studies (Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 
2014c), there is a growing consensus that political rights or institutions are more endogenous 
to productive structures, economic prosperity or economic rights  (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 
2014, p. 15).  
   In the second strand, consistent with Asongu (2014c), the schools of thought 
documented above can be further classified into the following. The first, pessimistic or 
neocolonial school which could also be known as the thesis typically sustains the priority of 
political rights or the Washington consensus. The second or balanced-development school 
which could also be qualified as an anti-thesis to the first school largely advocates for a 
Beijing model or priority in economic rights. Lastly, the third or accommodation school could 
also be viewed as a synthesis suggesting a reconciliation of the WC and the BM.  
 The third strand largely centers on discussions over whether economic rights or 
political rights should come first in the development process. The debate has been reconciled 
into what we term as the Moyo (2013) conjecture. While Moyo defines the WC as ‘state 
capitalism, deemphasized democracy and priority in economic rights’, she has also defined 
the BM as ‘state capitalism, deemphasized democracy and priority in economic rights’. 
Whereas, ‘political rights’ priorities are substantially the focus of the first school of thought, 
‘economic rights’ are the central element in the second school. The Moyo conjecture sustains 
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that economic rights or the BM should be prioritized in the short-run whereas political rights 
or the WC should be prioritized in the long-term.  
 The intuition behind the conjecture is that, a sustainable middle class is needed to 
demand political rights in a sustainable manner (Asongu, 2014c; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2014). 
Hence, once a burgeoning middle class has be established, the population would 
automatically demand political rights that would not be tainted with crony democracy 
because, this class would no longer be concerned about basic economic rights (of shelter and 
food) which are issues of low-income groups for  the most part. Since the BM has proven to 
deliver a burgeoning middle-class within a relatively shorter interval relative to  the WC, it is 
suggested by the conjecture to be the better short-term model.  Asongu (2014a) and Lalountas 
et al. (2011) have broadly confirmed this conjecture in African and developing countries 
respectively.  
 
3.2.2 Reconciling paradigms and agenda  
 
 The section addresses two main concerns. On the one hand, how the Moyo conjecture 
reconciles the Liberal Institutional Pluralism (LIP) and New Structural Economics (NSE) 
schools and, on the other hand, how the conjecture feels some gaps left by the two emerging 
paradigms in the literature. On this latter contribution of the conjecture, two points are worth 
emphasizing. First, it complements the LIP school by providing an institutional design of 
development. Accordingly, the Moyo conjecture clearly articulates what institutions are 
needed for what stages of development. While economic institutions are more important at the 
early stages of industrialization, political institutions become more relevant as the economy 
emerges and transits to a high income nation. Second, the NSE school is complemented by 
the conjecture in providing a unified theory that incorporates both State and market failures. 
Accordingly, while the BM proposed as a short-run development model favors State 
regulation and prudence in economic openness, the WC suggested for the long-term reflects 
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quite the opposite. On the former contribution, the proposed conjecture is such that, the 
institutional design for economic development is specifically reflected in the short-term and 
long-run models respectively.  
 We devote space to discussing how the conjecture relates to the NSE in subtle detail. 
As sustained by Fofack (2014), an interesting challenge in the NSE (see Acemoglu et al., 
2005, p. 387) is the absence of a causal linkage between a specific institutional design and 
economic prosperity. The conjecture addresses this concern by establishing that political 
(economic) institutions are more relevant at the later (early) stages of industrialization. This 
contribution also deviates from the fundamental one-size fits all frameworks that fail to take 
into account structural needs at each stage of the development process. Hence, the conjecture 
takes into account local conditions before recommending policy tools. For instance, the right 
to food is more relevant than the right to vote in low income countries. In a continent where 
poverty is substantially linked with huge capital flight (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2008, 2011, 
2012ab; Fofack & Ndikumana, 2010, 2014; Asongu, 2014d), the priority of infrastructural 
provision by the African Development Bank broadly substantiates the conjecture. 
 A fundamental assumption of the Moyo conjecture is that the WC is more sustainable 
than the BM because inequality has increased more with the BM than with the WC. Hence, 
according to the idea, the WC is more inclusive than the BM. But the relevance of this idea 
stops at two main issues. First,  Piketty (2014) has debunked the Kuznet’s (1955) ‘n-shaped’ 
relationship between industrialization and inequality which is an underlying assumption of the 
conjecture. Second, even without Piketty (2014), based on an exclusive Kuznet perspective, 
inequality in China would fall with the evolution of industrialization. Addressing these two 
highlighted issues is an interesting agenda for further research.  
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4. Conclusions 
 
Reconciling the two dominant development models of the Washington Consensus 
(WC) and Beijing Model (BM) remains a critical challenge in the literature.  The challenge is 
even more demanding when emerging development paradigms like the Liberal Institutional 
Pluralism (LIP) and New Structural Economics (NSE) schools have to be integrated. While 
the latter has recognized both State and market failures but failed to provide a unified theory, 
the former has left the challenging concern of how institutional diversity matter in the 
development process. We synthesize perspectives from over 150 recently published papers on 
development and Sino-African relations in order to present the relevance of both the WC and 
BM in the long-term and short-run respectively. While the paper provides a unified theory by 
reconciling the WC and the BM to complement the NSE, it at the same time presents a case 
for economic rights and political rights as short-run and long-run development priorities 
respectively. By reconciling the WC with the BM, the study contributes at the same to 
macroeconomic NSE literature of unifying a development theory and to the LIP literature on 
institutional preferences with stages of development. Hence, the proposed reconciliation takes 
into account the structural and institutional realities of nations at difference stages of the 
process of development. 
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